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Digital Audio Tape Machines: New
Technology or Further Erosion of
Copyright Protection?
A long, long time ago
and I can still remember
how that music used to make me smile,
and I knew if I had my chance,
that I could make those people dance
and maybe they'd be happy for awhile...
. . .But I knew I was out of luck
the day the music died.'
INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 1988, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA)2 mailed letters to several audio hardware man-
ufacturers, warning them that it would take immediate legal
action against any firm marketing digital audio tape (DAT)
machines in the United States. 3 The RIAA stated that it would
sue the manufacturers for "contributory infringement, ' 4 which
is defined as an activity by "[o]ne who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to
the infringing conduct of another. . .. ,,5 This action follows
Don McLean, American Pie (United Artists Records, Inc. 1980).
2 The RIAA is an organization representing the recording industry concerns. Its
"member companies produce and market about 90% of the prerecorded music sold
in the United States." See Copyright Issues Presented by Digital Audio Tape: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1987) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (statement of Jason S. Berman, President,
Recording Industry Association of America).
See Dupler, RIAA Letter Reinforces Its Threat on DAT, BnrLBOARD, June 11,
1988, at 1, col. 5.
4 Id.
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
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the RIAA's apparent failure to get congressional approval on
its proposed copycode scanning system, 6 which would prevent
taping of copyrighted materials with a DAT machine.
The letters are the latest action in an ongoing battle between
the RIAA and audio hardware manufacturers on the issue of
home taping as copyright infringement. 7 The RIAA has the
support of certain members of Congress, as evidenced by the
introduction of bills in the Senate' and the House of Represen-
tatives. 9 These bills propose that copycode scanners 0 be re-
quired in all digital audio recorders manufactured during the
next thirty-six months." In addition, the Reagan administration
has proposed similar bills12 that seek to make this requirement
permanent.' 3 However, to the apparent dismay of the RIAA,
the National Bureau of Standards recently determined that the
copycode scanner was ineffective for its proposed use. 14 This
6 See Pohlmann, DA T Hears Footsteps, DIGiTAL Autio & COMPACT Disc RE-
vmw, Aug. 1988, at 16.
7 See Dupler, supra note 3, at 90, col. 3.
S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
9 H.R. 1384, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
10 A "copy-code scanner" is an electronic circuit or comparable system
of circuitry (A) which is built into the recording mechanism of an audio
recording device; (B) which, if removed, bypassed, or deactivated, would
render inoperative the recording capability of the audio recording device;
(C) which continually detects, within the audio frequency range of three
thousand five hundred to four thousand one hundred hertz, a notch in
an encoded phonorecord; and (D) which, upon detecting a notch, pre-
vents the audio recording device from recording the sounds embodied in
the encoded phonorecord by causing the recording mechanism of the
device to stop recording for at least twenty-five seconds.
Id. at 2. See also S. 506, at 2.
1 See H.R. 1384, at 6; see also S. 506, at 6.
12 See H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987).
'1 Digital Audio Tape Recorders, 1987: Hearing on H.R. 1384 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., .st Sess. 9 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
1384] (statement of Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks of the United States Department of Commerce).
,4 The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) was asked by Congress to judge the
copycode scanner.
[The Congress'] request posed three questions: Does copycode achieve
its purpose, preventing [DAT] machines from recording? Does it diminish
the quality of the prerecorded material into which the notch is recorded?
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determination makes passage of the congressional bills highly
unlikely,' 5 thus forcing the RIAA to fall back on threats of
legal action.
While threats of litigation,1 6 marketing concerns, and the
objections of compact disc (CD) manufacturers' 7 have pre-
vented formal introduction of the DAT machine into the U.S.
market, some units are entering the country through a "gray
market."' 8 In addition, "[s]hould a lawsuit be initiated by the
RIAA, the defendant [manufacturer] will in theory be able to
draw upon a six-figure legal-defense fund established by the
Electronic Industries Assn [sic]. The fund ... will match any
Can the system be bypassed, and if so, how easily?
After five months of study, the NBS returned its findings, conclud-
ing that copycode was inadequate. Its 205-page report found that the
system generated both "false positives" and "false negatives"-that is,
non-encoded material could cause the system to incorrectly inhibit re-
cording, and some encoded material would not cause the system to inhibit
it. After testing 54 discs and 502 tracks, false positives were found for
16 tracks on 10 discs. False negatives occurred on about half the tracks
studied.
Aural tests determined that for some selections, listeners could detect
audible differences between encoded and unencoded material. In one
test, 69 out of 84 listeners could detect the difference more than 50
percent of the time. Finally, engineers at the NBS proposed five ways to
defeat copycode, all costing $100 or less to build. The NBS concluded:
"The system does not achieve its stated purpose."
Pohlmann, supra note 6, at 16.
" See Feighan, Digital Audio Tape: A View from the Hill, DIGITAL AUDIO &
COMPACT Disc REvmw, Sept. 1987, at 24 (article by Congressman Edward Feighan
(D-Ohio), member of the House Judiciary Committee which has oversight jurisdiction
of DAT).
16 See Pohlmann, supra note 6, at 16.
,7 Boundas, The Spoilers, STEREo REviEw, June 1987, at 6.
" di Perna, The Great DAT Caper, MusiciAN, August 1988, at 49, 50. In the
"gray market," DAT recorders are purchased by consumers in Japan and sold in the
U.S. According to di Pema, "There's absolutely nothing illegal about buying-or
even selling-a gray-market DAT machine. In fact the Supreme Court has recently
ruled in favor of gray-market sales of overseas goods." Id. at 50. See K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1987) (holding that the United
States Customs Service regulation permitting importation of certain "gray-market"
goods was valid inasmuch as it complied with 19 U.S.C.S. § 1526). In addition, Ford
Motor Company is offering DAT software to customers who buy DAT-equipped
Lincoln Continental models. However, their machine is a play-only device. See Pohl-
mann, Ford is First with DAT, DIGITAL AUDIO & COMPACT Disc REvmw, Feb. 1988,
at 8, col. 2.
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manufacturer funds needed for litigation . . . ." 19 Furthermore,
at least one member of Congress20 shares the manufacturers'
viewpoint that a 1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios,21 made home audio tap-
ing legal.
Technically, the Sony Court refused to take a stand on the
legality of home audio taping.22 Due to legislative inaction, the
RIAA is now faced with the task of forcing the federal courts
to decide this issue. A decision in favor of the RIAA would
create a cause of action against anyone engaged in home taping
or providing equipment for such taping. A decision for the
manufacturers would create greater problems for an industry
that already claims 1.5 billion dollar losses per year due to
home taping,23 and would further diminish the funds that are
available to support new artists.24 This Comment analyzes the
recording industry's potential for success in a suit against audio
hardware manufacturers for contributory infringement based
on the Sony decision and related cases, and the possible rami-
fications of such success.
I. WHAT iS DAT AND WHY IS IT SO SPECIAL?
Depending on the point of view taken, the DAT machine
is just a new tape recorder, or is the latest development in
digital technology undermining the intellectual property sys-
"9 See Dupler, supra note 3, at 90, col. 3.
20 See, e.g., Digital Audio Recorder Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 506 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transpor-
tation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 506] (statement of
John C. Danforth, Senator from Missouri announcing his intent to withdraw his
support from the bill. Danforth stated he opposed commercial piracy, but he does
not believe Congress should infringe on home taping for private, non-commercial
uses.).
21 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
1 Id. at 430 n.l1.
21 See Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 34 (citing Statement of Alan
Greenspan Regarding S. 1739, Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (Oct.
1985) [hereinafter Statement of Alan Greenspan]).
24 See Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 36 (statement of Jason S.
Berman).
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tem. 25 To most DAT supporters, the DAT machine is an "im-
portant evolutionary advance in home recording technology.
' 26
It combines video cassette recorder (VCR)27 recording methods2
with the digital electronics used in CD players. 29 Because the
audio signal is digital instead of analogue, the DAT machine
records and transmits the signal more accurately. 30 While DAT
possesses some of the same weaknesses of analogue tape in that
the physical tape can wear out and cannot be as easily accessed
as CDs, it may be able to record even greater frequencies than
the CD. 31 A home DAT machine will enable artists to record
their own works outside of a professional studio at a fraction
of the cost of buying professional equipment or renting studio
time. 32 Also, since the DAT cassette is almost half the size of
the standard cassette, DAT equipment is likely to be more
- See Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 11 (statement of Jason S. Berman); see
also Fleischmann, The Impact of Digital Technology on Copyright Law, 70 J. PAT.
& TADEARK OFF. Soc'y 5 (1988).
16 Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 73 (statement of Leonard Feldman, owner of
Leonard Feldman Electronics Laboratories).
27Although the Sony Court referred to the Betamax machine as a video tape
recorder, or "VTR," the common acronym for such machines is "VCR," derived
from "video cassette recorder." Therefore, the term "VCR" is intended as synon-
omous with the term "VTR" and will be used in this Comment.
Basically, DAT uses recording heads mounted on a rotating drum, with the
tape moving past at an angle. See Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 73-74 (statement of
Leonard Feldman); see also di Perna, supra note 18, at 54.
29 Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 21-22 (statement of Jason S. Berman).
30 See Fleischmann, supra note 25, at 6 (Whereas analogue systems reproduce
sounds on a tape or phonograph analogous in size and shape to the original, digital
recordings convert sounds in a binary sequence of digits 1 and 0, which are recorded
and then reconverted.); see also Fantel, Magic Made Simple: How CD's Work, N.Y.
Times, April 21, 1985, § 2, at 23, col. 1 (The analogue systems are "limited by the
inherent physical properties of their storage media. They depend on squiggles in a
groove or magnetic fluctuations on a tape .. "). Both album and tape media intro-
duce significant noise and cannot provide sufficient detail to reproduce high frequen-
cies accurately. See Brewer & Key, Digital Audio 101, part II, DiorrAL AuDio &
COMPACT Disc REvmw, Jan. 1988, at 90. Digital sound systems, on the other hand,
store sounds as a series of numbers, which are reconverted into a more accurate
representation of the actual sound without the negative factors involved in analogue
recordings. See id.
1, Fleischmann, supra note 25, at 9 n.31 (stating that DATs have a wider
frequency response than CDs and can reproduce sound more accurately).
31 Hearing on S. 506, supra note 20, at 110 (statement of Stevland Morris, a.k.a.
Stevie Wonder).
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compact, making personal transportation of the machines more
convenient. 33
The recording industry recognizes certain advantages in this
new system. In fact, professional DAT machines can be pur-
chased currently in the U.S. without any objections by the
RIAA.34 The reason the RIAA is resisting the DAT machine
for home use is because it provides audio pirates35 the ability
to make reproductions of copyrighted material that are identical
to the master copies. 36 Because the digital signal of a digital
recording is transferred onto a digital audio tape, subsequent
digital recordings suffer no loss in the audio signal.3 7 A digital
to digital transfer will result in a thousandth generation copy
that sounds identical to the master source. 38 Since record com-
panies do not currently have the technological capacity to pro-
vide pre-recorded music on DAT due to a lack of commercially
feasible high speed duplication equipment, 39 the RIAA fears
that the only practical use for DAT machines will be the pirat-
ing of copyrighted materials, which will cause significant losses
in revenue for recording artists. 40
DAT supporters, such as the Home Recording Rights Co-
alition (HRRC),4' 1 contend that home taping by private indivi-
duals is a legal, fair use of copyrighted materials. 42 However,
31 See Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 44 (statement of Jason S.
Berman).
34 See di Perna, supra note 18, at 54, 66.
31 Congress declared piracy, or the sale of counterfeit recordings, illegal in 18
U.S.C. § 2318 (Supp. 1988). See generally Annotation, Making, Selling or Distributing
Counterfeit or "Bootleg" Tape Recordings or Phonograph Records as Violation of
Federal Law, 25 A.L.R. Fm,. 207 (1975).
36 Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 44 (statement of Jason S. Berman).
3 Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 46.
19 Id. at 47.
4O Id. at 49; see also Home Video Recording: Hearing Before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 644 (Aug. 1986) (statement of Donald
J. Quigg).
" The HRRC is a broad-based group of companies, organizations, and people
formed after the court of appeals handed down its opinion in Universal City Studios
v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
See Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 89-90 (statement of Charles D. Ferris,
representative of the HRRC).
41 Id. at 98.
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the RIAA and some legal scholars disagree, contending that
the constitutional right "[tio promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts ' 4 has been repeatedly buffetted to the
detriment of artists' copyrights. 44 In 1983, surveys indicated
that Americans were taping 3.8 billion dollars worth of music
a year, 45 thereby displacing 1.5 billion dollars worth of sales
revenues.46 According to the Electronic Industries Association,
blank tape sales increased by twenty-one percent between 1985
and 1986,47 while record sales declined by five percent during
the same period. 48 To the RIAA, these figures add up to lost
profits for its artists due to copyright infringement. 49 To pre-
vent DAT from contributing to this home taping problem, the
RIAA has supported proposed legislation that would require
copycode scanning devices.50 After hearings in April and May
of 1987, the House Commerce and Judiciary Committee sent
models of the copycode scanner to the National Bureau of
Standards (NBS) for analysis.5 1 The NBS's rejection of the
scanner has placed the RIAA in a defensive posture.5 2 If the
RIAA does sue a manufacturer for contributory infringement,
both sides are likely to rely heavily on the Sony decision to
support their respective positions. The outcome of such litiga-
tion may affect judicial opinions on fair use and contributory
infringement, and will be crucial in deciding both the fate of
the DAT machine and the rights of consumers to tape in their
own homes.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
"See, e.g., Berger, Betamax Meets the Supreme Court: A Judicial Disappoint-
ment, 20 NEW ENG. L. Rnv. 285 (1984-85); Fleischmann, supra note 25; Nimmer,
Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA.
L. REv. 1505 (1982).
," See Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 33-34 (citing Audits and Surveys,
Home Taping in America: 1983, reprinted in Video and Audio Home Taping: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 193-224 (1983)).
46 See id. at 34 (citing Statement of Alan Greenspan).
41 Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 34-35 (statement of Jason S. Ber-
man).
'a Id. at 35.
,Id. at 36; see also Pohlmann, supra note 6, at 16.
, See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
s, Pohlmann, supra note 6, at 16; see also supra note 14.
52 Pohlmann, supra note 6, at 16.
1988-89]
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II. THE SONY DECISION
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,53 the
Supreme Court held that the use of a VCR for time-shifting5 4
purposes was not a violation of copyright laws.5 5 Because the
Court's holding was limited to VCRs, 56 both supporters and
opponents of DAT turn to the case as authority for the legality
of home audio taping.57 The situation is further complicated
because the opinions of the district court (Sony 1)18 and the
court of appeals (Sony i1)59 were published and heavily com-
mented on before the Supreme Court handed down its opinion
(Sony II1).0 A review of these three decisions will aid in un-
derstanding the views of both sides.
Universal City Studios and Walt Disney Productions sued
Sony Corporation, the manufacturer of the Betamax VCR, in
the District Court for the Central District of California, along
with the Sony Corporation of America, four retail establish-
53 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
14 See infra note 104.
11 Sony I1, 464 U.S. at 456. For ease of reference, the opinion of the district
court will be referred to as Sony I, the opinion of the court of appeals will be referred
to as Sony II, and the Supreme Court's opinion will be referred to as Sony III.
56 The Court based its holding on two conclusions: a significant number of
copyright holders "who license their works for broadcast on free television would not
object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers" and that "respon-
dents failed to demonstrate that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of non-
minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works."
Sony III, 464 U.S. at 455-56. Given the narrowness of the Court's focus, and the
unlikelihood that the holding could apply to any other existing copying format, it is
safe to assume the Court intended its holding only to apply to VCRs.
11 Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 40 (statement of Jason S. Berman). Contra
id. at 122 (statement of Charles D. Ferris) ("It was the basic insight of the Supreme
Court in the Betamax case that it would be dangerous, in such circumstances, to infer
contributory infringement.").
11 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
19 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963.
60 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. 417. See, e.g.,
Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other
Than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use? An Economic Analysis of the Sony
Betamax and Williams and Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 647 (1984); Nimmer,
supra note 44; Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an
Advanced Technological Era, 96 HAlv. L. REv. 450 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Toward
a Unified Theory]; Note, Home Taping of Sound Recordings: Infringement or Fair
Use?, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 647 (1982-83) [hereinafter Note, Home Taping].
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ments, and one VCR owner.6 1 The plaintiffs complained that
home video taping of their copyrighted works constituted copy-
right infringement and that the corporate defendants were liable
as direct, contributory and/or vicarious infringers. 2 The district
court held that home taping for personal use was not copyright
infringement.6 1 More significantly for the purposes of this Com-
ment, the court concluded that the statute's legislative history
established ari implied exemption from copyright infringement
liability for home audio taping. 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed 65 the district court's decision of the video
taping issue because it could find "no clear legislative language
indicating that home video recording is not within the exclusive
rights created by § 106 [of the Copyright Act]." '66 At the same
time, the court distinguished video tapes from audio tapes
stating that "[t]he copyright statute treats sound recordings
and audiovisual works as separate categories of protected ma-
terials. "67
The Supreme Court, in overruling the court of appeals, 68
held that the sale of home VCRs to the general public did not
constitute contributory infringement of copyrights because the
plaintiffs failed to show that time-shifting of programs would
cause any significant harm to the value of the copyrights.6 9 In
addition, the Court stated that many copyright holders who
license their works for broadcast on free television would not
object to having their programs time-shifted by private view-
ers. 70 The Court noted Sony's argument that the legislative
history of the Sound Recording Act of 197 17* created a home
audio and video recording exemption. However, the Court
stated that "in view of our disposition of the contributory
61 Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 433.
62 Id. at 432.
61 Id. at 469.
" Id. at 444-46.
61 Sony II, 659 F.2d at 977.
Id. at 968.
67 Id. at 967 (footnote omitted).
Sony III, 464 U.S. at 456.
69 Id.
70 Id.
72 Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971)
(amended 1976).
1988-89]
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infringement issue, we express no opinion on that question." ' z
Thus, by reserving its, opinion on this issue, the Court refused
to either accept or reject the lower courts' interpretation of the
1971 Home Recording Act, leaving the subject open to debate.
With this background in mind, the RIAA's current position,
that home audio taping with a DAT machine is illegal and that
DAT manufacturers would be committing contributory in-
fringement, will now be discussed.
III. Holm TAPING: FAiR USE OR CONTRIBTJTORY
INFRINGEMENT?
Copyright law derives its legal authority from the Consti-
tution, which provides that "Congress shall have Power ..
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '1 3 Federal
law totally preempts state and common law in this area.74 "The
term 'writings' has historically been interpreted broadly,"75 and
currently is defined as that which is "fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which [the original work or authorship] can be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device. ' 7 6
In the past, Congress has responded to changes in technol-
ogy by extending copyright protection to developments such as
photography, 77 audio recordings, 78 and computer programs.7 9
In 1976, the U.S.- copyright laws were substantially revised, and
extended protection to "original .works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
Sony III, 464 U.S. at 430 n.ll.
71 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
-, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1977) (expressly pre-empting state or common law copyright
laws).
, Drabiak, Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: A Primer on Protecting Intel-
lectual Work Product, 11 S. ILI. U.L.J. 1, 12 (1987).
" 17 U.S.C. § 102(A) (1977).
7, See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540.
71 See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1, b-e, 85 Stat. 391-92 (1971)
(amended 1976).
79 See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
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oped."80 Before the 1976 revision, Congress imposed iio stat-
utory limitatiotis on an author's exclusive rights of
reproduction."' Instead, a judicially created doctrine of fair
use82 was applied3 to assure that the limited monopoly grarited
to copyright holders did not conflict with "the competing in-
terest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of ideas. 18 4
The courts have applied this doctrine when the use of the
copyrighted material acts to foster, rather than to deter, crea-
tive activity and dissemination. ss The 1976 revision1, in effect,
codified the judicial doctrine of fair use. 6
The exclusive rights of a copyright holder are described in
17 U.SC. § 106.87 These rights ate the exclusive rights of
17 U.S.C. § 102(ay (982Y
El See Nimmer, supra note 44, at 1507.
n "'Fair use' is privilege in other than owner of copyright to use copyrighifed
material in reasonable manner without consent, notwithstanding monopoly granted to
the owner." BLACK'& LAW DICTIONARY 538 (5th ed. 199).
11 See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1896), Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C. D. Mass. 184f) (eamples of pre-1909' fair use cases);
see also Iowa State University Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980); Williams & Wilkins Company v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl, 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420' U.S. 376 (1975)
(per curiam) (examples of more recent cases).
"4 "Successive ages. have drawn different balances among the interest, of the
writer in' the control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related! interest
of the publisher, and the competing interest of society in- the untrammeled dissemi-
nation of ideas." B. KAPtwN, Akz UNmIrRRE VIEw oF CoPYRrHT, viii (1967).
"5 See, e.g., supra note 83 and sources cited therein; see also L. SELTZER,
ExMP'TIO14S AND FAIR USE IN COPYRrGHT (1978) (providing a history of the develop-
ment of the judicial doctrine of fair use and criticism of the current statutory scheme).
11 See id. at § 107.
§ 106. ExcusivE RIGHTS, IN COPYRIGHTED" WORKs
Subject to' sections, 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:,
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrightedi work;
(3). to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4). in, the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreograhic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
to perform the copyrighted work publicly'; and'
(5) in the case of literary, musical,, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic,. or sculptural' works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,; to
display the copyrighted work publicly..
rd. at § 106.
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reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and dis-
play.8s In order to determine whether DAT manufacturers will
be liable for contributory infringement, the rights under 17
U.S.C. § 106 must be balanced with the fair use exceptions set
out in 17 U.S.C. § 107,89 also taking into account the interpre-
tations of contributory infringement in Sony II and subsequent
cases.
17 U.S.C. § 501 provides that "[a]nyone who violates any
of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by
sections 106 through 118 ... is an infringer of the copyright." 90
As previously noted, a contributory infringer is defined as one
"who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of an-
other . -.91 To hold the DAT manufacturers liable as con-
tributory infringers, opponents must first establish primary
liability for home taping.92 More so than in the Sony case,
,s See Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-1476-General
Scope of Copyright, reprinted in Historical Note following 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 at 100
(West 1977).
89 Section 107 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonore-
cords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any partic-
ular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall include
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
9 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted); see also Universal City Studios v. Sony
Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 975 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(adopting Gershwin definition).
92 See generally Nimmer, supra note 44, at 1527 (this liability is based on an
assumption that the equipment was manufactured principally for making unauthorized
copies).
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opponents of DAT appear to have a strong case for establishing
infringement. 93
DAT supporters argue that the House report on the 1971
amendment 94 supports their contention that Congress intended
to exclude home use audio recording from the scope of the
1909 act.9 5 However, as Melville B. Nimmer 96 points out, the
relied-upon passage, 97 when read in context, shows that the
committee did not intend to create a special exemption for
home audio recording. The Sony II court agreed with Nim-
93 See infra notes 101-48 and accompanying text.
H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 7, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADnsm. NEws 1566, 1572. For the text in dispute, see infra note 97.
93 See Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 444
(C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see
also Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 139 (statement of Charles D. Ferris).
- The late Mr. Nimmer was a renowned authority on copyright law, and his
opinions were cited in all three Sony cases. See, e.g., Sony I, 480 F. Supp. at 451;
Sony II, 659 F.2d at 967; and Sony III, 464 U.S. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11 In approving the creation of a limited copyright in sound recordings it
is the intention of the Committee that this limited copyright not grant
any broader rights than are accorded to other copyright proprietors under
the existing title 17. Specifically, it is not the intention of the Committee
to restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records,
of recorded performances, where the home recording is for private use
and with no purpose of reproducing or otherwise capitalizing commer-
cially on it. This practice is common and unrestrained today, and the
record producers and performers would be in no different position from
that of the owners of copyright in recorded musical compositions over
the past 20 years.
H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. 7, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM. NEws 1566, 1572.
9' Nimmer, supra note 44, at 1508-11.
The most telling argument against the [Sony i] court's interpre-
tation of the House report is the language of the report itself. The
Committee's statement that "it is not the intention . . . to restrain ...
home recording," if read in context, reveals that the Committee never
intended to create a special exemption for audio home recording. The
passage in which the home recording remark appears states that "it is
the intention of the Committee that this limited [sound recording] cop-
yright not grant any broader rights than are accorded to other copyright
proprietors under the existing title 17 .... [T]he record producers and
performers would be in no different position from that of the owners of
copyright in recorded musical compositions over the past 20 years." This
language emphasizes the point that the 1971 Amendment extends to the
owners of sound recording copyrights the same statutory protection al-
ready granted to the owners of musical composition copyrights. No one
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mer's position and noted that this language was not repeated
in the legislative history accompanying the 1976 act. 99 Finally,
as Nimmer notes:
[a]ny lingering doubt as to whether the copyright act of 1976
inclides a special exemption for home recording is laid to
rest by the following passage from the House report on the
1976 Act: "[Ilt is not intended to give [taping] any special
status under the fair use provision or to sanction any repro-
duction beyond the normal and reasonable limits of fair
use. )3'10o
So, for home tapers to avoid the charge of copyright infringe-
ment, they must qualify under the fair use provisions of section
107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
IV. HoME TAPING WnTH DAT CONSTITUTES INFRINGEMENT
Following the Supreme Court's ruling that individual VCR
owners could copy free television broadcasts for the purposes
of time-shifting, 0 1 at least one commentator feared that the
Court's philosophy would "drastically affect the ability of au-
thors to control the use of their works."' 1 2 However, this fear
seems exaggerated for a number of reasons. First, the Court
was responding to a well-established technology, already in the
homes of millions of consumers. 0 3 More importantly, the de-
cision was very narrowly defined. The Court held only that
private home taping of a public broadcast, provided free to the
has claimed that the pre-1971 copyright statutes contained any provision,
other than the doctrine of fair use for exempting home recording from
copyright infringement of the musical works thereby produced. Since the
House report states that the purpose of the Amendment is to extend the
same protection to sound recordings, it is clear that the Amendment did
not create a new exemption for home recording, The most one can fairly
attribute to the House report, then, is an opinion that home recording
constitutes fair use.
Jd. at 1510-11.
Sony 11, 659 F.2d at 967 n.5.
11 Nimmer, supra note 44, at 1517 (quoting H.R. Rep. No, 1476, 94th, Cong.,
2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 5659, 5679).
101 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
102 Berger, supra note 44, at 285.
103 See Sony III, 464 U.S. at 422.
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public, for the purpose of time-shifting, 0 4 was a fair use. 05 By
applying the fair use criteria for VCRs used in Sony III to
DAT, the RIAA appears to have a strong argument for in-
fringement 0 6
Although section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 does
not limit consideration to the four outlined criteria in deter-
mining fair use, 0 7 the courts give primary consideration to the
factors listed in the statute. 08 For this reason, each factor is
discussed in detail below.
A. The Purpose and Characler of the Use
In Sony fII, the Court's opinion applied only to time-
shifting of free programs for home use. 09 The Court found
that "evidence concering 'sports, religious, educational and
other programming' was sufficient to establish a significant
quantity of broadcasting whose copying is now authorized, and
a significant potential for future authorized copying.""' 0 In
addition, the evidence presented at trial showed that some
1' Time-shifting was defined as the ability 1) to tape a show for later viewing
when the individual is engaged in watching a show simultaneously being broadcast on
another channel, or 2) to have the -machine record a desired program for later viewing,
through the use of the automatic timer device on the VCR, When the individual is not
at home. Id. at 423; Berman argues that time-shifting does not apply to audio
recording. He states:
The Home Recording Rights Coalition argues that home taping is really
just the innocent practice of shifting the playing of a musical recording
from one playback device to another. But this neologism makes no
sense. . .. [I]fyou do not want to carry a bulky hard-cover book to the
beach, but prefer to bring a paperback, you cannot go into a bookstore
and demand a paper back for free just because you have already pur-
chased the hard-cover edition. So it is with music: If you have already
bought a record or a CD, and you decide that you want a tape cassette
version, you should pay for it. The .concept of play-shifting is nonsensical
and unfair.
Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 50.
105 See Sony 1i, 464 U.S. at 456.
'°6 See infra -notes 110-34 and accompanying text.
1w See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
113 See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1175 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that "[njormally these four factors would
govern the analysis").
109 See Sony II, 464 U.S. at -456.
11 Id. at 444.
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copyright owners had no objection to home taping for noncom-
mercial use."'
In contrast, the majority of home audio tapings are made
from purchased or borrowed commercial recordings." 2 A num-
ber of artists and copyright holders have objected to home
taping."' The recordings are not provided to the public free of
charge, as were the videotaped programs in Sony. Because
prerecorded DAT cassettes are not available on the market, the
machines, at least presently, can only be used to record from
other sources." 4 Such use seems more of a commercial than a
non-profit educational use."15
The statutory purposes cited as appropriate to a finding of
fair use" 6 are limited to "the context of a further commentary
... by the person using the copyrighted work.1" 7 In these
circumstances, the courts believe "the public benefit from the
dissemination of a new work . . . outweigh[s] the earlier au-
thor's copyright interest. ' " 8 Because home recording for en-
"I Id. at 445-46.
11 See Note, Home Taping, supra note 60, at 652 n.28 (citing W. HAMILTON, A
SURVEY OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH TAPE PLAYBACK EQUIPMENT 8 (1979)). This survey,.
commissioned by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, "found that most record taping
involves albums, and that rock music was by far the most common type of music
taped." Id. at 655 n.56 (quoting HAMILTON, supra, at 6).
"3 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 25 (statement of Emmylou
Harris); Hearing on S. 506, supra note 20, at 71-73 (statement of Mary Travers,
representing the band Peter, Paul, and Mary). But see id. at 110 (statement of Stevland
Morris in favor of home recording); cf. Taylor, To Notch or Not to Notch, DIGITAL
AUDIO, Oct. 1987, at 7 (taking note of opposition and support for the DAT copycode
scanner).
114 See Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 30 (statement of Berman).
M' "The statute does not, however, draw a simple commercial/noncommercial
distinction. The statute contrasts commercial and non-profit educational purposes,
and there is no question that the copying of entertainment works for convenience does
not fall within the latter category." Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America,
659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
116 The purposes are "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for class room use), scholarship or research . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982).
117 Nimmer, supra note 44, at 1521. Nimmer states that fair use has always
involved a second author's use of the original author's work. "In such circumstances,
the public benefit from the dissemination of the new work may be said to outweigh
the earlier author's copyright interest." Id.
"I Id.; see, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (holding that the fair use doctrine allows courts to
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tertainment purposes is not considered a productive use,119 it
cannot be said that the purpose and character of taping with a
DAT machine qualify under the first requirement of fair use.
B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The nature of the copyrighted work has rarely been relied
upon by the courts. 20 In Sony III, the Supreme Court did not
directly discuss this criterion. However, the court of appeals
stated that "the scope of fair use is greater when informational
type works, as opposed to more creative products, are involved
.... If a work is more appropriately characterized as enter-
tainment, it is less likely that a claim of fair use will be
accepted."12' In Loew-s Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, 22 the district court stated that "[a]s we draw further away
from the fields of science or pure or fine arts, and enter the
fields where business competition exists, we find the scope of
fair use is narrowed but still exists.' ' 23 Most copied sound
recordings are "products of originality" and intended "to en-
tertain, not to instruct.' 24 As such, they should not be classi-
fied as fair use under this criterion.
C. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
As with the second criterion, Sony III does not concentrate
on the amount and substantiality of the portion used. In Walt
Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,25 the court stated that
balance "the exclusive rights of a copyright holder with the public interest in dissem-
ination of information affecting areas of universal concern").
"9 See Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "Fair Use" Looks
Different on Videotape, 66 VA. L. REv. 1005, 1012-14 (1980) (discussing the principle
of productive use).
11 See Hayes, Classroom "Fair Use": A Re-evaluation, 26 BULL. CR. Soc. 101,
110-11 (1978).
M Sony 11, 659 F.2d at 972.
122 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom., Benny v. Loews Inc., 239
F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per
curiam).
123 Id. at 175 (emphasis in original).
224 Nimmer, supra note 44, at 1522.
'- 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., O'Neill v. Walt Disney
Productions, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
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"[w]hile other factors in the fair use calculus may not be
sufficient by themselves to preclude a fair use defense, this and
other courts have adopted the traditional American rule that
excessive copying precludes fair use."' 126 Home audio taping
almost "always involves the reproduction of an entire work."'' 2
As Nimmer notes, "It is the whole song, not merely a particular
passage, that the home recorder wishes to capture.' 1 28 There-
fore, home taping with the DAT is not fair use under this
criterion. 129
D. The Effect of Copying on the Market for the Copyrighted
Work
Sony III put much emphasis on the effect of copying on
the market for the copyrighted work. The Court stated that the
plaintiff's failure to prove that time-shifting "has impaired the
commercial value of [the] copyrights or has created any likeli-
hood of future harm" left the Court with no basis on which
to find the defendants liable.' 30 The plaintiffs "offered no
evidence of decreased television viewing by Betamax own-
ers,' 131 and failed to show that time-shifting would cause an-
ything but minimal "harm to the potential market for, or the
value of, their copyrighted works. 11 32
The recording industry has conducted various studies that
indicate substantial losses in sales due to home taping. 33 As
Nimmer notes,
If this fourth factor is ever to militate against application of
the fair use defense, it must do so in the case of audio home
,16 Id. at 758; see also Whitol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir 1963) (stating
that it is inconceivable that the copying of all, or substantially all, of a copyrighted
song can constitute fair use).
"27 Nimmer, supra note 44, at 1522.
Us Id.
129 But see Williams and Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1347, 1362
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam),
wherein the copying of entire scientific articles was held to be a fair use. The circuit
court, in Sony II, distinguishes home taping from the copying of scientific articles.
See Sony II, 659 F.2d at 971.
110 Sony 11I, 464 U.S. at 421.
131 Id. at 424.
V3Z Id. at 456.
133 See generally Note, Home Taping, supra note 60 and sources cited therein.
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recording. Those who argue that home taping should be
regarded as fair use because it is noncommercial in nature
have overlooked its substantial commercial effect .... [Flor
fair use purposes, [the taper's] motivation is nevertheless
commercial. By engaging in audio home recording, he avoids
the cost of purchasing records or prerecorded tapes.' 34
Unlike Sony III, the evidence here supports a finding that home
copying has a detrimental effect on the market for the copy-
righted work. Therefore, the DAT fails to qualify as fair use
under this criterion, as well. Thus, under the criteria of section
107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, home taping with the DAT
does not appear to be a fair use of the copyright.
V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Even if a court determines that home taping with DAT does
not constitute fair use, other factors may prevent the RIAA
from proving contributory infringement on the part of the
manufacturers. For example, Sony III indicated the Court's
reluctance to expand copy protections without explicit legisla-
tive guidance. 135 Unlike the VCR, Congress has already had
several conferences regarding DAT and the proposed copycode
scanner, 36 and the courts may hesitate to address an issue
pending before Congress.
Should a court view this issue as justiciable, it would prob-
ably follow the lead of Sony III in holding that "the sale of
copying equipment ... does not constitute contributory in-
fringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unob-
jectionable purposes,' 37 or is only "capable of substantial
"4 Nimmer, supra note 44, at 1524. Cf. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-
29 (1942) (finding that wheat grown and consumed at home can cause a decrease of
the amount of wheat sold in interstate commerce, thus allowing Congress to regulate).
' "Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Con-
gress when major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials.
Congress has the Constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate
fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by
such new technology." Sony Corp of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 431 (1984).
23 See Joint Hearing, supra note 2; Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13;
Hearing on S. 506, supra note 19.
,,7 Sony III, 464 U.S. at 442.
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noninfringing uses." 1 38 In the DAT dispute, however, prere-
corded cassettes are not yet available, 13 9 so the machines are
most likely to be used to record from other sources. As previ-
ously noted, professional DAT machines are already available
for recording by musicians.1 40 Therefore, the RIAA is resisting
DAT machines that will have only substantially infringing uses.
The Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management'4' test for contributory infringement contains two
elements: knowledge of infringement and contribution to that
known infringement.' 42 By resisting the copycode scanner so
stringently, DAT manufacturers reveal that they are aware of
a possible infringement problem. Indeed, they admit that con-
sumers tape at home but contend that, after the ruling in Sony
III, such activities are legal. 43 Regarding the second element,
a manufacturer has not yet attempted to release a DAT ma-
chine. However, an analogy to regular cassette tape recorders
suggests that a court could find that the DAT machine contrib-
utes to copyright infringement. Two cases, Electra Records Co.
v. Gem Electronic Distributors'" and RCA/Ariola Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 45 found suppliers of
blank tape liable for copyright infringement. In Electra, the
defendant supplier provided a "make-a-tape" service to defen-
dant stores that sold blank tapes and allowed customers to
copy original copyrighted materials .146 The defendants were
held liable because they provided the mechanism for a foresee-
138 Id.
M' Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 13, at 30 (statement of Jason S. Berman).
-4 See di Perna, supra note 18, at 54.
14. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) (The court's definition of contributory infringe-
ment was adopted by the district court and court of appeals in Universal City Studios
v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 459 (C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963,
at 975 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
"4 Id. at 1162.
143 There is no reason whatsoever for'the Congress to assume that DAT
recorders are somehow illegitimate. As you are aware, under both the
1971 legislative history accompanying the Sound Recording Act and case
law, private consumer home taping is legal. No lawsuit has ever been
brought claiming that audio home taping, by consumers, is illegal.
Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 102 (statement of Charles D. Ferris).
- 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
145 845 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1988).
146 Electra, 360 F. Supp. at 822-23.
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able infringement. 147 In RCA/Ariola, the manufacturers were
held vicariously liable for issuing directives on the use of the
machines and profiting by their use. 148
The DAT manufacturers appear to meet both criteria for
contributory infringement. DAT manufacturers have reason to
fear liability for contributory infringement, and this may be
why they have delayed release of DAT machines to date.
CONCLUSION
If the RIAA successfully prevents DAT manufacturers from
releasing the machines in the U.S., it will have only prevented
a new technology while leaving the original problem of home
taping intact. Other threats, such as recordable CDs, 149 loom
on the horizon. A judicial victory for the RIAA will not solve
its major problem regarding copyright infringement. Commen-
tators have suggested several solutions to the ultimate prob-
"4 Id. at 824-25.
148 RCA/Ariola, 845 F.2d at 781-82. In RCA/Ariola, the defendant Metacom
manufactured and placed its Rezound machines in defendant retailer's stores. The
machines were equipped only to accept specially notched blank tapes, which Metacom
sold to retailers, who in turn sold them to customers. Id. at 777. While copyright
warnings were attached to the machines, the court found that-Metacom's authority to
control the machines, along with its "financial interest in the copying as the source
for the notched blank tapes needed to use the machine, sufficed to render Metacom
vicariously liable." Id. at 778. In Sony III, the Court noted,
As the District Court correctly observed, . . . "the lines between direct
infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not
clearly drawn. . . ." (citation omitted) The lack of clarity in this area
may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely
one who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but
also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted work without actual
authority from the copyright owner.
... We also observe, however, that reasoned analysis of respon-
dents' unprecedented contributory infringement claim necessarily entails
consideration of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded
under the other labels, and indeed the parties to a large extent rely upon
such arguments and authority in support of their respective positions on
the issue of contributory infringement.
Sony III, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17.
"I "On April 22 [19881, Texas' Tandy Corporation (of Radio Shack fame)
announced that it had developed recordable/erasable compact disc technology." Pohl-
mann, DAT Hears Footsteps, supra note 6, at 16.
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lem,'50 and Congress needs to act soon on one of these proposals
to prevent the further erosion of copyright protection of sound
recordings. A failure to respond to changes in technology may
result in dwindling fees for recording artists and funds to
develop new talent,1 51 inevitably leading to "the day the music
died." 152
Todd Page*
For example, the Register of Copyrights would prefer a royalty solution (see
Joint Hearing, supra note 2, at 145), as would Nimmer (see Nimmer, supra note 44,
at 1529-34). Fleishmann calls for the repeal of the fair use doctrine, to allow copyright
law its full effect. See Fleishmann, supra note 25, at 25. A normative solution has
been suggested, wherein activities are broken down into economic and derivitive
dimensions, commercial and noncommercial, interactive and iterative. See Note, To-
ward a Unified Theory, supra note 60, at 460-68.
,15 [One] reason that the DAT recorder is such a threat to musicians is
that it will severely limit their opportunities to make recordings. Reduced
sales of records will means less money for record companies to invest in
new recordings.
And it is not only musicians who will suffer at the hands of DAT
machines. There will also be artists, performers, producers, and thoul-
sands of workers and craft-persons of every kind who provide the nec-
essary support to create the work of art that is a sound recording.
Hearing on H.R. 1384, supra note 12, at 79 (statement of Victor W.
Fuentealba, President of the American Federation of Musicians);
The costs of creating and recording has (sic) risen enormously in the last
25 years... If the recording companies' ability to recoup its costs are
damaged by the copying of its product by others, the recording industry
as a whole will be less able to invest in new artists.
But in the end, it is the individual artist that [sici is hurt most of all.
The legitimate income from his or her copyrighted work will be greatly
diminished, and the economic base that should have sustained the artist
in order to be able to continue to create new work is destroyed.
Hearing on S. 506, supra note 20, at 72 (statement of Mary Travers, of Peter, Faul,
and Mary).
,1z I went down to the sacred store,
where I'd heard the music years before
but the man there said the music wouldn't play..
... the day the music died.
American Pie
Don McLean, supra note I.
* This Comment has been entered in. the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
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